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Abstract In this paper, we introduce the concept of a representative value function
in a group decision context. We extend recently proposed methods UTAGMS-GROUP
and UTADISGMS-GROUP with selection of a compromise and collective preference
model which aggregates preferences of several decision makers (DMs) and represents
all instances of preference models compatible with preference information elicited
from DMs. The representative value function is built on results of robust ordinal
regression, so its representativeness can be interpreted in terms of robustness concern.
We propose a few procedures designed for multiple criteria ranking, choice, and sort-
ing problems. The use of these procedures is conditioned by both satisfying different
degrees of consistency of the preference information provided by all DMs, as well as
by some properties of particular decision making situations. The representative value
function is intended to help the DMs to understand the robust results, and to provide
them with a compromise result in case of conflict between the DMs.
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1 Introduction
Decision aiding is defined as an activity of using some models which help answering
questions asked by stakeholders in a decision making process (Roy 1985). Conclu-
sions which stem only from the analysis of performances of considered alternatives
on a set of criteria are usually too weak to significantly contribute to the elements of
these answers. Therefore, working out a recommendation relies to a high degree on
the preference information elicited from the stakeholders playing the role of decision
makers (DMs). This information may be either direct or indirect. In the first case, it
specifies directly values of some parameters used in the preference model. In the other
case, the preference information is composed of some examples of holistic judgments
on a subset of alternatives AR ⊆ A, which are called reference alternatives and play
the role of a training set. Indirect preference information is used in the disaggrega-
tion-aggregation paradigm (Jacquet-Lagrèze and Siskos 1982). The idea of inferring
compatible instances of a preference model which restore the exemplary statements
provided by a DM, has been employed in methods involving three main families
of preference models: an outranking relation (Mousseau and Słowin´ski 1998), a set
of decision rules (Greco et al. 1999), and a value function (e.g., the UTA method
Jacquet-Lagrèze and Siskos 1982; Siskos et al. 2005).
Since there are many parameters of the preference model to be estimated, there are,
typically, many alternative optimal solutions, i.e. compatible instances of a preference
model. As a result, the output of the method may vary substantially depending on
which solution is selected. Traditionally, existing approaches based their outcomes
only on a single compatible instance of a preference model. Computing final recom-
mendation, they, indeed, neglected the fact of possible existence of many alternative
instances of a preference model inferred from the provided preference information.
Thus, it seemed reasonable to take into account all instances of a preference model
compatible with the preference information provided by the DM, and to work out a
recommendation for the set of alternatives A taking into account all these compatible
instances. As a result, the principle of robust ordinal regression has been proposed
(Greco et al. 2010c), and two new methods based on this principle, UTAGMS (Greco
et al. 2008) and GRIP (Figueira et al. 2009), have been presented. These methods
consider the whole set of value functions compatible with the preference information
provided by the DM, while traditional UTA-like methods are using only one such
value function or a limited subset of such functions. In Kadzin´ski et al. (2012a), one
has extended these methods by an analysis of extreme ranking results. Having con-
sidered complete rankings that follow the use of all compatible value functions, one
can determine the best and the worst ranks taken by each alternative a ∈ A. Further,
robust ordinal regression has been adapted in the UTADISGMS method to deal with
sorting problems (Greco et al. 2010b), and in ELECTREGKMS, which is a general
scheme implementing this paradigm to outranking methods (see Greco et al. 2011b,
2009). Robust ordinal regression has also been applied to preference model based on
Choquet integral in order to handle interaction among criteria (Angilella et al. 2010).
All these methods supply the DM with two kinds of results: necessary and possible.
The necessary result (ranking or assignment) specifies the most certain recommen-
dation worked out on the basis of all compatible instances of a preference model
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considered jointly, whereas the possible result identifies a possible recommendation
which stems from the use of at least one compatible instance of a preference model.
The family of robust ordinal regression methods has been originally designed to deal
with preferences expressed by a single DM. However, in Greco et al. (2011a) and Greco
et al. (2009) this principle has been enlarged on group decision. The main multiple cri-
teria decision methods to which robust ordinal regression has been applied are consid-
ered there, and corresponding methods for group decision have been obtained. Within
the framework of UTAGMS-GROUP, UTADISGMS-GROUP, and ELECTREGKMS-
GROUP, several DMs can cooperate to make a collective decision. They share the
same description of the decision problem, i.e. the set of alternatives, consistent family
of criteria, and evaluation matrix. For each DM, who expresses her/his individual pref-
erence information, we use the respective GMS or GKMS method, and check whether
the necessary and possible preference relations or assignments hold either for at least
one or for all DMs. Thus, we consider two levels of certainty. The first level is related
to verification of the necessary and possible consequences of preference information
provided by each DM. The other level involves indication whether in the considered
set of DMs the specific outcome is confirmed by at least one DM (possibly) or by
all DMs (necessarily). In this way, we are reasoning in terms of the necessary and
possible outcomes and coalitions of DMs, and we arrive to four types of results: nec-
essary-necessary (i.e., result which is necessary for all DMs), necessary-possible (i.e.,
result which is necessary for at least one DM), possible-necessary (i.e., result which is
possible for all DMs), and possible-possible (i.e., result which is possible for at least
one DM).
The main aim of this paper is to introduce the concept of a representative value func-
tion in robust ordinal regression applied to multiple criteria group decision problems.
Despite the interest of the robust rankings and assignments provided by the family of
GROUP methods, for some decision-making situations we need to provide a univocal
recommendation, and, e.g., assign a single score to each alternative. Moreover, the
robust results might not be understandable to some DMs. Therefore, we propose to
work out a single preference model and representative results which follow its use,
without loosing advantage of knowing all compatible value functions for all DMs. We
have already considered similar requirements with respect to a single DM (see Greco
et al. 2011c; Kadzin´ski et al. 2012b). The representative value function is about to
highlight the most stable part of the robust results, i.e., the necessary-necessary pref-
erence relation for problems of ordering alternatives from the best to the worst, and
possible-necessary assignments for sorting problems. In order to control the differ-
ences between values of alternatives we use a maximin rule. Moreover, we distinguish
three types of decision making situations conditioned by different degrees of consis-
tency of the preference information. Precisely, we consider cases where preference
information provided by all DMs can or cannot be represented jointly by at least one
value function, and a case where preference information of each DM is compatible
when analyzed individually.
Till now, UTA-like methods have been used in several works for conflict resolution
in multi-actor decision making (Jacquet-Lagrèze and Shakun 1984; Jarke et al. 1987;
Matsatsinis and Samaras 2001). In the introduced approach, we extend the family of
GROUP methods, not only supporting DMs with a very intuitive representation of the
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output of robust ordinal regression, but also providing an insight into an achieved con-
sensus solution. Consequently, we combine the robustness analysis conducted within
UTAGMS-GROUP and UTADISGMS-GROUP with the clarity of classical UTA-like
methods. The presented approach may be of interest to researchers in management
and business with such applications as, e.g., evaluation of consumers’ preferences,
personnel selection, or allocation of priorities to projects. However, it is important to
stress that following the assumption of the GROUP methods, the introduced proce-
dure could be used only in these group decision problems where performances of all
considered alternatives on the common family of criteria are the same for all DMs.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, we recall the basic
principles of robust ordinal regression methods within Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
(MAUT), i.e. UTAGMS and UTADISGMS along with their extensions dealing with
preferences expressed by several DMs. Section 3 is devoted to presentation of the rep-
resentative value function in the context of multiple criteria group decision. Section 4
presents two didactic examples relative to applications of the presented methodology
aiming to recommend the best choice, or ranking, or sorting of alternatives. We pro-
vide the detailed results of the robust ordinal regression methods, and present the way
these outcomes may be enriched with selection of the representative value function.
Finally, Sect. 5 provides conclusions and avenues for future research.
2 Reminder on Robust Ordinal Regression Methods Within the Framework
of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
We are considering decision situations in which a finite set of alternatives A = {a1,
a2, . . . , ai , . . . , an} is evaluated on a consistent family of criteria G = {g1, g2, . . . , g j ,
. . . , gm}. The evaluation of ai ∈ A on criterion g j ∈ G is denoted by g j (ai ). The
set of all different evaluations on g j is denoted by X j , and ordered values of X j are
denoted as: x1j , x2j , . . . , x
n j




j , k = 1, 2, . . . , n j − 1, n j ≤ n.
In order to represent DM’s preferences, we use a preference model in the form
of an additive value function U (a) = ∑mj=1 u j (g j (a)) ∈ [0, 1], where u j is the
marginal monotone value function for criterion g j , u j (x1j ) = 0, for all j ∈ J , and∑m
j=1 u j (x
n j
j ) = 1. The comprehensive value serves as an index used to decide the
position in the ranking, or presence in the subset of the best alternatives, or the assign-
ment to the predefined ordered classes.
In this section, we recall two groups of robust ordinal regression methods in the
framework of MAUT. One of them is designed to deal with ranking and choice prob-
lems, whereas the other is intended to support decision processes related to sorting
problems. Note that we are considering the choice problem as a particular case of the
ranking problem.
2.1 Robust Ordinal Regression for Ranking and Choice Problems
The idea of considering the whole set of compatible value functions to deal with
ranking and choice problems was originally introduced in the UTAGMS method
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(Greco et al. 2008). The initial idea of selecting a value function representing the pos-
sible and the necessary preference relations was introduced in Figueira et al. (2008).
In the same vein the procedure for selecting a representative value function among all
compatible ones was proposed in Kadzin´ski et al. (2012b). Finally, the approach was
extended in UTAGMS-GROUP to handle a group decision context (see Greco et al.
2011a, 2009).
The UTAGMS procedure starts with asking the DM for preference information
in the form of pairwise comparisons for some reference alternatives. Then, it leads
through the statement of appropriate ordinal regression problems which define the set
of compatible value functions, i.e. such value functions that can restore all pairwise
comparisons provided by the DM. The method results in calculation of two binary
preference relations on the set of all alternatives:
– necessary weak preference relation N , in case U (a) ≥ U (b) for all compatible
value functions;
– possible weak preference relation P , in case U (a) ≥ U (b) for at least one com-
patible value function.
From the two weak preference relations N and P , one can get preference, indif-
ference, and incomparability in a usual way.
Robust ordinal regression for ranking and choice problems has been applied to
group decision in the UTAGMS-GROUP method. Let us denote the set of DMs by D
= {d1, . . . , dp}. For each dr ∈ D′ ⊆ D, who expresses her/his individual preferences
as in UTAGMS, we consider all compatible value functions, and, subsequently, we
calculate the necessary and possible preference relations Ndr and 
P
dr . With respect
to all DMs, four situations are interesting for a pair (a, b) ∈ A × A:
– a N ,ND′ b: a 
N
dr b for all dr ∈ D′,
– a N ,PD′ b: a 
N
dr b for at least one dr ∈ D′,
– a P,ND′ b: a Pdr b for all dr ∈ D′,
– a P,PD′ b: a Pdr b for at least one dr ∈ D′.
On the basis of these four relations, we can identify results reflecting sure and possible
with respect to the preference information provided by at least one or all DMs.
2.2 Robust Ordinal Regression for Sorting Problems
The principle of robust ordinal regression has been applied to sorting problems in
UTADISGMS (Greco et al. 2010b). Then, the concept of a representative value func-
tion was presented in Greco et al. (2011c), and the method was extended to the case of
several DMs in UTADISGMS-GROUP (see Greco et al. 2011a, 2009). Let us denote
predefined preference ordered classes, each having a specific semantic definition, by
C1, C2, . . . , C p , where Ch+1 is preferred to Ch, h = 1, . . . , p − 1.
In UTADISGMS, the DM is asked for preference information in the form of a
set of assignment examples, each one consisting of an alternative a∗ ∈ AR ⊆ A
and its desired assignment a∗ → [CL DM (a∗), CRDM (a∗)]. The set of inferred com-
patible value functions consists of such value functions that are able to reproduce all
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assignments given by the DM for reference alternatives. The method returns two kinds
of assignments for any alternative a ∈ A:
– the possible assignment C P (a) determines the set of indices of classes Ch for
which there exists at least one compatible value function U ∈ UAR assigning a to
Ch :
C P (a) = [LUP (a), RUP (a)] = {h ∈ H : ∃U ∈ UAR : h ∈ [LU (a), RU (a)]},
– the necessary assignment C N (a) specifies the set of indices of classes Ch for which
all compatible value functions U ∈ UAR assign a to Ch :
C N (a) = [LUN (a), RUN (a)] = {h ∈ H : ∀U ∈ UAR : h ∈ [LU (a), RU (a)]},
where LU (a) and RU (a) are, respectively, the worst and the best class to which
an alternative a is assigned by value function U .
Within UTADISGMS-GROUP method, for each a ∈ A and for each dr∈D′ ⊆ D, we
determine the necessary C Ndr (a) and possible C
P
dr (a) assignments as in UTADIS
GMS
.
Then, for each subset of DMs, D′ ⊆ D, we define the following four types of assign-
ment:






















By analogy to UTAGMS-GROUP, these assignments reflect sure or possible results for
at least one or all DMs.
3 Selection of a Representative Value Function in Group Decision Making
In this section, we introduce the concept of a representative value function in the con-
text of multiple criteria group decision. The representative value function provides
synthetic representation of all compatible value functions, it returns a numerical score
for each alternative, and it permits assessing relative importance of criteria understood
as their maximal share in a comprehensive value. In the proposed methodology, out-
comes of all compatible preference models are represented by a single value function.
When applied to group decision problems, the representative function serves moreover
as a compromise group solution. Since the analysis of a single representative value
function is less abstract than that of the whole set of compatible value functions, we
facilitate understanding of the results of robust ordinal regression, and enable easy
and intuitive comparison of consequences of one’s preferences with the consensus
representing the whole group of DMs. Thus, the motivation for extending the family
of GMS and GROUP methods with this approach is even more sound than for MCDA
approaches considering preferences of just a single DM.
The idea underlying our proposal for selection of the representative value function
is to stress the differences between values of some alternatives taking into account
the most stable part of the robust results, i.e. necessary-necessary preference relations
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for multiple criteria ranking problems, or possible-necessary assignments for multiple
criteria sorting problems. Generally, we wish to emphasize the difference between
values of alternatives if one can observe the evident advantage of one alternative
over the other, or diminish this difference when it is impossible or very difficult to indi-
cate the better alternative. Consequently, we use minimax and maximin rules to control
the difference between values of alternatives. Whether we maximize or minimize the
difference between U (a) and U (b) for a given pair of alternatives (a, b) ∈ A × A,
is conditioned by satisfying specific binary relations. Precisely, if one alternative is
better than the other for all compatible value functions, i.e. its rank is higher or a class
assigned to it is better, the difference between their values should be as large as possi-
ble. On the contrary, if two alternatives are necessarily indifferent or incomparable in
terms of all compatible rankings or assignments, the difference between their values
should be minimized. In this way, we are building the representative value function
on the outcomes of robust ordinal regression. As a result, the selected value function
is representative in the sense of robustness concern.
In the following sections, we consider different types of decision making situations.
Firstly, if pieces of preference information provided by all DMs are complementary
when considering jointly, then, in order to identify a representative value function,
we suggest employment of a suitably adapted procedures for a single fictitious DM
whose preferences consist of pairwise comparisons or assignments given by all DMs.
Secondly, if exemplary statements of each DM are consistent when considered indi-
vidually, but not necessarily consistent when considered jointly, we refer to the results
of the corresponding GROUP method, and we make the desired difference between
values of specific alternatives dependent on the number of DMs for whom the relation
holds. Precisely, this intensity is connected with the inclusion relation on the set of all
subsets of DMs. Note that distinction between these two cases may also be made on
a different ground. If the set of alternatives is numerous, and the DMs serve as experts
only with respect to its small disjoint subsets of alternatives, then it is reasonable to
combine their knowledge into preference information of a single fictitious DM. On
the other hand, if the DMs have outlook of the whole set of alternatives (usually, when
it is small), and their exemplary decisions are interrelated, then it is more suitable to
analyze their statements separately, and examine subsequently the spaces of agree-
ment and disagreement. However, this remark should only be treated as a suggestion
for the case of an automatic choice of the procedure. Nevertheless, in general, it is the
matter of the analyst which procedure will be used.
3.1 Representative Value Function for the Case of Preference Information
of All DMs Considered Jointly
In this section, we consider a decision making situation where pieces of preference
information provided by all DMs can be represented together by at least one additive
value function composed of general marginal value functions. To verify whether it
is possible for the set of DMs D′ ⊆ D, preference information given by all DMs
from D′ is translated into the set of constraints, E ARD′,X , where for ranking problems
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U (a∗) ≥ U (b∗) + ε if a∗ dr b∗











whereas for sorting problems (E ARD′,X ) = (E A
R
D′,sort ), such that:
U (a∗) ≥ U (b∗) + ε, ∀a∗ ∈ ARdi , b∗ ∈ ARd j





Along with constraints ensuring monotonicity of the marginal value functions and nor-
malization of the comprehensive values to the range between 0 and 1, this set forms
the set of linear constraints E ARD′ , which defines the set of compatible value functions.




u j (xkj ) − u j (x (k−1)j ) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , m, k = 2, ..., n j
u j (x1j ) = 0, j = 1, . . . , m,
∑m
j=1 u j (x
n j











Let us denote by ε∗ the maximal value of ε obtained from the above program (i.e.,
ε∗ = max ε, s.t. E ARD′ ). The set of compatible value functions UD′ is not empty if
E ARD′ is feasible and ε
∗ > 0. If there is no value function compatible with the pref-
erence information provided by all DMs, i.e. ε∗ ≤ 0 or E ARD′ is infeasible, one may
either identify reasons of incompatibility in order to remove it, or determine the rep-
resentative value function for the maximal number of DMs whose statements are not
contradictory. Dealing with the incompatibility issue is discussed in Sect. 3.3.
If preference information provided by all DMs from D′ is consistent, one may select
the representative value function considering jointly all pieces of preference informa-
tion supplied by these DMs. In this case, for multiple criteria ranking problems one
obtains two preference relations, such that for any pair of alternatives (a, b) ∈ A × A:
– a ND′ b : a is ranked at least good as b if and only if, U (a)≥U (b) for all compatible
value functions U ∈ UD′ ;
– a PD′ b : a is ranked at least good as b if and only if, U (a) ≥ U (b) for at least
one compatible value functions U ∈ UD′ .
The truth and falsity of the necessary ND′ and possible PD′ preference relations is
verified by solution of appropriate LP problems. To check whether a ND′ b, we cal-
culate ε∗ = max ε, subject to E ARD′ incremented with a constraint U (b) ≥ U (a) + ε.
If ε∗ ≤ 0, then a ND′ b. On the other hand, to check whether a PD′ b, we calculate
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ε∗ = max ε, subject to E ARD′ incremented with a constraint U (a) ≥ U (b). If ε∗ > 0,
then a PD′ b.
Necessary weak preference relation ND′ is a partial preorder (i.e., it is reflexive
(a ND′ a, since for all a ∈ A, U (a)=U (a)), and transitive (for all a, b, c ∈ A,
if a ND′ b and b 
N
D′ c, then a 
N
D′ c). Possible weak preference relation PD′ is
a strongly complete (i.e. for all a, b ∈ A, a PD′ b or b PD′ a), and negatively
transitive (i.e. ∀a, b, c ∈ A, if not (a PD′ b) and not (b PD′ c), then not (a PD′ c))
binary relation.
Binary relations ND′ and PD′ satisfy the following interesting properties.
Proposition 31 For any subset of decision makers D′ ⊆ D, if UD′ = ∅, then:
1. N ,ND′ ⊆ ND′ ,
2. PD′ ⊆ P,ND′ ,
Proof Notice that all compatible value functions of each DM from D′ do not nec-
essarily represent all preferences of all DMs from D′. It is the case, because UD′
constitutes intersection of the sets of compatible value functions of particular DMs
from D′. Since UD′ = ∩dr ∈D′Udr ⊆ ∪dr ∈D′Udr , then on condition that UD′ is not
empty, for all a, b ∈ A:
1. a N ,ND′ b ⇒ a ND′ b, i.e. N ,ND′ ⊆ ND′ .
2. a PD′ b ⇒ a P,ND′ b, i.e. PD′ ⊆ P,ND′ . unionsq
Since ND′ ⊆PD′ and P,ND′ ⊆P,PD′ , we also know that ND′ ⊆P,ND′ and PD′ ⊆P,PD′ .
Thus, the following inclusion relations are true:
N ,ND′ ⊆ ND′ ⊆ PD′ ⊆ P,ND′ ⊆ P,PD′ .
Proposition 32 Considering two subsets of DMs, D′ ⊆ D′′ ⊆ D, if UD′′ = ∅, then:
1. ND′ ⊆ ND′′ ,
2. PD′′ ⊆ PD′ .
Proof Notice that D′ ⊆ D′′ implies that UD′′ ⊆ UD′ . If so:
1. ND′⇒ND′′ , i.e. ND′ ⊆ ND′′ .
2. PD′′⇒PD′ , i.e. PD′′ ⊆ PD′ . unionsq
For multiple criteria sorting problems, one obtains two kinds of assignments for any
alternative a ∈ A:
– C PD′(a)={h ∈ H, ∃U ∈ UD′ : h ∈ [LU (a), RU (a)]}, i.e. a set of indices of clas-
ses Ch for which there exists at least one value function U ∈ UD′ assigning a to
Ch ;
123
438 M. Kadzin´ski et al.
– C ND′(a) = {h ∈ H,∀U ∈UD′ : h ∈ [LU (a), RU (a)]}, i.e. a set of indices of classes
Ch for which all value functions U ∈ UD′ assign a to Ch .
Reasoning analogously to the conclusions drawn for ranking problems, we can state
that assignments C ND′ and C
P
D′ satisfy the following interesting properties.
Proposition 33 For any subset of decision makers D′ ⊆ D and for all a ∈ A, if
UD′ = ∅, then:
1. C N ,ND′ (a) ⊆ C ND′(a),
2. C PD′(a) ⊆ C P,ND′ (a),
Proof Analogously to the proof of Proposition 31, with the proviso that we consider
the assignment of alternative a to class C(a) rather than the weak preference relation
a  b. unionsq
Proposition 34 Considering two subsets of DMs, D′ ⊆ D′′ ⊆ D, if UD′′ = ∅, then:
1. C ND′(a) ⊆ C ND′′(a),
2. C PD′′(a) ⊆ C PD′(a).
Proof Analogously to the proof of Proposition 32. unionsq
In order to translate the concept of representativeness into mathematical formulations,
at first we need to define binary relations which build on the results of robust ordinal
regression. They allow easy indication of the better alternative within a given pair of
alternatives, or provide evidence about indifference or incomparability of the alterna-
tives with respect to the outcomes of all compatible instances of the preference model.
The truth of these relations for some specific pairs would condition the desired dif-
ference between their comprehensive values. With respect to multiple criteria ranking
problems, let us consider the following binary relations for pairs (a, b) ∈ A × A:
– a ND′ b, i.e. a ND′ b and not (b ND′ a)—in this case the advantage of a over b
is evident, since for all compatible value functions U ∈ UD′ , a is at least good as
b, while the opposite relation is not true;
– not (a ND′ b) and not (b ND′ a)—in this case neither a is strongly necessarily
preferred to b, nor b is strongly necessarily preferred to a; as a result, they are either
necessarily incomparable, i.e. a RND′b, or necessarily indifferent, i.e. a ∼ND′ b; in the
former case, for some U1 ∈ UD′ , a is preferred to b, but for some other U2 ∈ UD′ ,
b is preferred to a; in the other case (a ∼ND′ b), the comprehensive values of a and
b are equal for all compatible value functions.
Considering the above relations, in a representative case, we wish to maximize the
difference between U (a) and U (b) for (a, b), such that a N b, and to minimize this
difference for (c, d), such that not (c N d) and not (d N c).
With respect to multiple criteria sorting problems, let us consider the following binary
relations:
– a →D′ b, which means that for all compatible value functions U ∈UD′ , a is
assigned to a class better than the class of b, i.e. for all U ∈ UD′ , such that
LU (a) > RU (b);
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– a ∼→D′ b or a ≺→D′ b, where the former relation means that for any compatible
value function U ∈ UD′ , a is assigned to the same range of classes as b, i.e. for
all U ∈ UD′ , such that LU (a) = LU (b) and RU (a) = RU (b), and the latter
relation means that the order of classes for alternatives a and b is not univocal
(i.e. for some compatible value functions alternative a is classified better than b
whereas for some other compatible value function it is classified worse: there exist
U1, U2 ∈ UD′ , such that LU1(a) > RU1(b) and LU2(b) > RU2(a)).
Analogously to the interpretation presented for the case of ranking problems, in a
representative case, we aim to maximize the difference between U (a) and U (b) for
a, b ∈ A, such that a → b, and to minimize this difference for c, d ∈ A, such that
c ∼→ d or c ≺→ d. Notice that we would like to achieve these targets for a single
value function. However, according to the experiments we have conducted, if we first
maximized the difference between values of some specific pairs of alternatives, there
would not be much space for its minimization with respect to some other pairs of
alternatives. Therefore, within the proposed framework, we look for the best possible
compromise between these two targets. If after the proper procedure there is still more
than one optimal value function, we choose the one for which the sum of elementary
components is maximal.
Obviously, it is possible to conduct optimization of these differences taking advan-
tage of other rules that have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., Bous et al. 2010;
Despotis et al. 1990). However, we have decided to apply a maximin rule, and search
for such a function in the feasible space, which maximizes the smallest distance to any
introduced constraint. The selected solution is equivalent to the center of the largest
circle that can be inscribed into this space. Note that in this case, the obtained results
could be easily interpreted. For example, for ranking problems, we can observe what
is the minimal difference between comprehensive values of alternatives related by the
necessary ND relation, and what is the maximal difference between comprehensive
values of alternatives which are related by necessary incomparability RND . In this way,
we could examine the extent to which it was possible to emphasize the results of robust
ordinal regression.
Procedure for Selection of a Representative Value Function
for Group Ranking Problems
In order to select a representative value function for group ranking problems one may
use the following procedure:
1. Ask all DMs from D′ for pairwise comparisons of reference alternatives.
2. Verify if the set of compatible value functions UD′ is not empty.
3. Check the truth of the necessary ND′ and the possible PD′ weak preference rela-
tions for all a, b ∈ A.
4. For all quadruples of alternatives (a, b, c, d) ∈ A × A × A × A, such that a ND′ b
and not (c ND′ d) and not (d ND′ c), add the following constraints to the linear
programming (LP) constraints E ARD′ for ranking problems:
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{
U (a) − U (b) ≥ U (c) − U (d) + ε(a, b, c, d),
ε(a, b, c, d) ≥ ε.
5. Maximize ε, subject to the set of LP constraints from point 4). This amounts to
the following optimization:
maxU∈UD′ {mina,b,c,d∈A{[U (a) − U (b)] − [U (c) − U (d)],
for a, b, c, d ∈ A, such that a ND′ b and not (c ND′ d) and not (d ND′ c)}}.
6. Add the constraint ε = ε∗, with ε∗ = max ε from the previous point, to the set of
LP constraints considered in point 5).
7. Maximize
∑
a,b,c,d : aND′b and not (cND′d) and not (dND′c) ε(a, b, c, d), subject to
the set of LP constraints from point 6).
After optimizations, for all alternatives in A we are able to read off the representa-
tive comprehensive values and their marginal components from the solution of the LP
problem. On this basis, we are able to draw representative marginal and comprehensive
U RD′ value functions. The comprehensive values assigned to considered alternatives
can be used to rank the alternatives.
Procedure for Selection of a Representative Value Function
for Group Sorting Problems
In case of group sorting problems, the following procedure for selection of a repre-
sentative value function corresponds to the previously discussed concept of represen-
tativeness:
I. Ask all DMs for possibly imprecise assignment examples of reference alterna-
tives.
II. Verify if the set of compatible value functions UD′ is not empty.
III. Determine the possible sorting C PD′(a) and the necessary sorting C
N
D′(a) for
each considered alternative a ∈ A. For all pairs of alternatives (a, b) ∈ A × A,
check the truth or falsity of relations a →D′ b, a ∼→D′ b, and a ≺→D′ b (the
corresponding algorithms are described in Greco et al. 2011c).
IV. For all quadruples of alternatives (a, b, c, d) ∈ A× A× A× A, such that a →D′ b
and c ∼→D′ d or c ≺→D′ d, add the following constraints to the LP constraints
E ARD′ for sorting problems:
{
U (a) − U (b) ≥ U (c) − U (d) + ε(a, b, c, d),
ε(a, b, c, d) ≥ ε.
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V. Maximize ε, subject to the set of LP constraints from point IV). This amounts
to the following optimization:
maxU∈UD′ {mina,b,c,d∈A{[U (a) − U (b)] − [U (c) − U (d)],
for a, b, c, d ∈ A, such that a →D′ b and (c ∼→D′ d or c ≺→D′ d)}}.
To save space, we do not provide similar explanations for the optimizations con-
ducted in the procedures presented in the following sections. They would be
analogous to these which are presented here.
VI. Add the constraint ε = ε∗, with ε∗ = max ε from the previous point, to the set
of LP constraints considered in point V).
VII. Maximize
∑
a,b,c,d : a→D′b and (c∼→D′d or c≺→D′d) ε(a, b, c, d), subject to the set
of LP constraints from point VI).
After the above optimizations, for all alternatives in A we are able to read off the
representative comprehensive and marginal values. The preference model selected
according to the above principles, can be used along with the assignment examples
supplied at the beginning by all DMs to drive an autonomous example-based sort-
ing procedure (see Greco et al. 2011c, 2010b), which would deliver representative
assignments to classes for all considered alternatives.
In the above procedures we account for two targets. One of them consists in maxi-
mization of the difference between values of alternatives satisfying a specific binary
relation which confirms the advantage of one alternative over the other alternative. The
other target consists in minimization of the difference between values of alternatives
satisfying some other binary relations which indicate that the result of the comparison
of a pair of alternatives is not univocal. Although in a general case, we recommend
selection of a value function that would reflect the best compromise between these
two targets, one can also imagine iterative optimization of these targets. Then, in the
following iterations we would account for the values of already optimized targets. In
this case, the selected value function would be the most discriminant with respect to
pairs of alternatives related by the necessary relation for ranking problems, or pairs for
which the intervals of assigned classes are always disjoint for sorting problems. On the
other hand, if one would perform minimization in the initial step, the function would
account first and foremost for equalization of the values of alternatives not related by
the necessary preference, or alternatives being in the same class for all compatible
value functions or those for which the order of classes is not univocal.
3.2 Representative Value Function for the Case of Preference Information
of Each DM Considered Individually
In this section, we consider a decision making situation where preference information
provided by each DM is consistent when analyzed separately, i.e. UAR ,dh = ∅, for
all dh ∈ D, while preference information of all DMs considered jointly is not neces-
sarily consistent. If the set of compatible value functions for each DM is not empty,
we compute results of a corresponding GROUP method, and we employ an adapted
123
442 M. Kadzin´ski et al.
procedure for selection of the representative value function. It consists in consider-
ation of the same conditions as in procedures presented in Sect. 3.1, but the desired
intensity of difference between comprehensive values of specific alternatives depends
on the inclusion relation on the set of all subsets of DMs for whom these relations
hold. Precisely, the greater the number of DMs for whom the specific relation holds,
the greater or the less the difference between values of alternatives depending whether
originally we wanted to maximize the minimal difference or minimize the maximal
difference, respectively.
Procedure for Selection of a Representative Value Function for Group
Ranking Problems
The procedure for selection of a representative value function for group ranking deci-
sion problems is based on the exploitation of the necessary-necessary preference rela-
tion and weighting the desired difference between values of alternatives by the number
of DMs for whom the specific conditions hold. The general idea is to maximize the
difference between values of alternatives which are related by the necessary-necessary
preference relation for any subset of DMs. The more DMs for whom this condition
holds, the greater the difference should be. Simultaneously, we minimize the differ-
ence between values of alternatives which are not necessary-possibly preferred one to
another. By analogy, the more DMs for whom aforementioned relation holds, the less
the desired difference. Note that applying these rules is conditioned by the truth of the
inclusion relation between the subsets of DMs for whom we observe specific results.
The following procedure for selecting a representative value function for ranking and
choice problems corresponds to the above interpretation of representativeness:
1. Determine the necessary and the possible weak preference relation in the con-
sidered set of alternatives for each DM. Combine them into necessary-necessary,
necessary-possible, possible-necessary, and possible-possible results.
2. For all quadruples of alternatives (a, b, c, d) ∈ A× A× A× A, such that a N ,ND′′ b
and c N ,ND′′′ d and D′′′ ⊂ D′′ ⊆ D′, and neither b N ,PD′ a nor d N ,PD′ c, add the
following constraints to the LP constraints of UTAGMS:
{
U (a) − U (b) ≥ U (c) − U (d) + ε(a, b, c, d),
ε(a, b, c, d) ≥ ε.
3. Maximize ε, subject to the set of LP constraints from point 2), and conduct the
subsequent steps to optimize the sum of elementary components ε(a, b, c, d) anal-
ogously to steps 6 and 7 of the procedure from Sect. 3.1.
Let us explain more clearly the idea underlying consideration of the condition specified
in point 2 of the above procedure. We identify quadruples (a, b, c, d) ∈ A×A×A×A,
such that a N ,ND′′ b and c N ,ND′′′ d with D′′′ ⊂ D′′ ⊆ D′. Since more DMs confirm
the truth of relation N for a pair (a, b) than for (c, d), it is reasonable to require
the difference between U (a) and U (b) to be greater than between U (c) and U (d).
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Notice that at the same time for all dr ∈ D′ \ D′′, we have not (a Ndr b), whereas for
all dh ∈ D′ \ D′′′, we have not (c Ndh d). Therefore, from another perspective, since
(D′ \ D′′) ⊂ (D′ \ D′′′), we require the difference between U (c) and U (d) to be less
than between U (a) and U (b).
Viewing all conditions defined in point 2 as a logical whole, we wish the difference
between U (a) and U (b) for a, b ∈ A, such that for all dr ∈ D, a Ndr b, to be the great-
est, the difference between U (c) and U (d) for c, d ∈ A, such that for all dr ∈ D′ ⊂ D,
c Ndr d, to be slightly less, and the difference between U (e) and U ( f ), such that for
all dr ∈ D′, not (e Ndr f ), to be the least. We exclude from consideration in this
point such pairs a, b ∈ A, for which we can observe the contradictory strict necessary
preference relations with respect to the set of DMs D, i.e. a N ,PD′ b and b N ,PD′ a. In
this case, we can simply say nothing about the desired difference between U (a) and
U (b), because for some DMs a is preferred to b, whereas for some other DMs b is
preferred to a.
Note that in the above procedure, we do not associate the desired intensity of
difference between comprehensive values of alternatives directly with the number
of DMs confirming the specific relation, but rather with inclusion relation on the
set of all subsets of DMs. To explain this proposal, let us consider the set of DMs
D ={d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, and its subsets D′ = {d1, d2, d3} and D′′ = {d4, d5}. In case,
a N ,ND′ b and c N ,ND′′ d, one may claim that the desired difference between U (a)
and U (b) should be greater than the difference between U (c) and U (d), only because
more DMs support the advantage of a over b than the advantage of c over d. How-
ever, subsets D′ and D′′ are not related by the inclusion relation, and thus they are
incomparable in terms of the partial order determined by ⊆ on the set of all sub-
sets of D. If so, one should not formulate any direct requirements with respect to
comparison of U (a) − U (b) and U (c) − U (d). This example proves why, in gen-
eral, it is not justified to relate the desired intensity of difference with the cardi-
nalities of subsets of DMs only. Instead, we consider such pairs of alternatives for
which the specific results are confirmed by proper (strict) subsets of DMs. In other
words, when considering a pair (a, b), such that a N ,ND′ b, with D′ = {d1, d2, d3},
we may wish that U (a) − U (b) is greater than U (e) − U ( f ) for pairs (e, f ),
such that e N ,ND′′′ f , with D′′′ ∈ {∅, {d1}, {d2}, {d3}, {d1, d2}, {d1, d3}, {d2, d3}},
and less that U (g) − U (h) for pairs (g, h), such that g N ,ND′′′′ h, with D′′′′ ∈{{d1, d2, d3, d4}, {d1, d2, d3, d5}, {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}}. In this case, one can easily com-
pare arguments supporting the advantage of one alternative over the other.
Procedure for Selection of a Representative Value Function
for Group Sorting Problems
The procedure for selection of a representative value function for group sorting prob-
lems maximizes the difference between values of alternatives, such that one of them is
always assigned to a class better than the other, and minimizes the difference between
values of alternatives which do not have this property. Again, the intensity of differ-
ence between values of alternatives depends on the inclusion relation on the subsets
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of DMs who confirm the specific observation for different pairs (a, b) ∈ A × A. The
transposition of the above idea into optimization terms is done in a similar way as for
ranking problems. The procedure for selection of a representative value function for
group sorting problems is presented below:
I. Determine the possible sorting C Pdr (a) and the necessary sorting C
N
dr (a) for each
considered alternative a ∈ A for each DM, dr ∈ D′. For all pairs of alternatives
(a, b) ∈ A × A, check the truth or falsity of relations a →dr b, a ∼→dr b, and
a ≺→dr b for each dr ∈ D′.
II. For all quadruples of alternatives (a, b, c, d) ∈ A × A × A × A, such that
a →dh b, for all dh ∈ D′′, and c →dk d, for all dk ∈ D′′′, and D′′′ ⊂ D′′ ⊆ D′,
and neither b →dr a nor d →dr c for any dr ∈ D′, add the following constraints
to the LP constraints of UTADISGMS:
{
U (a) − U (b) ≥ U (c) − U (d) + ε(a, b, c, d),
ε(a, b, c, d) ≥ ε.
III. Maximize ε, subject to the set of LP constraints from point II), and conduct the
subsequent steps to optimize the sum of elementary components ε(a, b, c, d)
analogously to steps VI and VII of the procedure from Sect. 3.1.
Notice that one can generalize the above formulations in order to deal with the
coalitions of DMs, and not just single DMs. This might be required, if prefer-
ence information is supplied by experts from different companies or agencies,
e.g., D′ = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dk}, where D1 ={d1, . . . , di }, D2 ={d j , . . . , dm}, . . ., Dk =
{dp, . . . , ds}. Then, it would be reasonable to treat each coalition of DMs in the way a
single DM is treated in the standard formulation of the procedure, and check the truth
of inclusion relation in the second point of the above procedures with respect to the
coalitions D1, . . . ,Dk , rather than DMs d1, . . . , ds, considered individually.
3.3 Analysis of Incompatibility
In case of incompatibility, there is no value function U compatible with the preference
information provided by all DMs. Notice that UD′ corresponds to the intersection of
sets of compatible value functions for all dr ∈ D′ (each one being non-empty). This
means that exemplary decisions of at least two DMs are contradictory. Such a situation
may occur if some pieces of preference information do not match the additive model,
or most often if their decision policy differs substantially. Treating the problem, one
may identify some reasons for either removing it, or searching for a representative
value function for a minimal magnitude of the error, or a minimal number of contra-
dictory statements, or a maximal number of DMs whose reference statements are not
contradictory.
Notice that in the first case, one needs to extend the set of constraints E ARD′ with an
additional inequality ε ≥ ε∗, such that ε∗ = max ε, s.t. E ARD′ , so that the resulting new
constraints E ARD′,ext are feasible. Let us rather focus on the latter case, which is more
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specific for group decision problems. At first, we need to identify the troublesome
pieces of preference information responsible for incompatibility. There may exist sev-
eral sets of pairwise comparisons or exemplary assignments which, once removed,
make the set of compatible value functions non-empty. Performing these computa-
tions for all D′′ ⊂ D′ enables to identify coalitions of convergent DMs, for which the
necessary and possible consensus rankings or assignments exist. Main steps of the pro-
cedure which identifies these coalitions are outlined below. This procedure is inspired
by the general schemes for analysis of incompatibility introduced in Mousseau et al.
(2003) and Mousseau et al. (2006).
Identification of the contradictory statements requires solving a mixed integer pro-
gramming (MIP) problem. Using binary variables va∗,b∗ associated with each couple
of reference alternatives (a∗, b∗), such that a∗  b∗ for any DM in case of rank-
ing problems, or Ldi (a∗) > Rd j (b∗) for sorting problems (with the proviso that the
assignments for a∗ and b∗ may have been provided by different DMs), one rewrites




. Subsequently, to identify a minimal subset






















U (a∗) + Mva∗,b∗ ≥ U (b∗) + ε if a∗ dr b∗, dr ∈ D′
U (a∗) + Mva∗,b∗ ≥ U (b∗)




if a∗ ∼dr b∗, dr ∈ D′












U (a∗) + Mva∗,b∗ ≥ U (b∗)+ε, for all a∗∈ARdi , b∗∈ARd j
such that Ldi (a∗) > Rd j (b∗), di , d j ∈ D′








where ε is a small positive value and M > 1.
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If va∗,b∗ = 1, then the corresponding constraint is satisfied whatever the value func-
tion is, which is equivalent to elimination of this constraint. The optimal solution
indicates one of the minimal subsets of conditions being the cause of incompatibility.
Other subsets can be identified by solving this problem with additional constraint that
forbids finding again the same solution:
∑
(a∗,b∗)∈Si
va∗,b∗ ≤ f ∗i − 1,
where f ∗i is the optimal value of the objective function of (E A
R
D′ )
′ in the i-th iteration,
Si = {(a∗, b∗) ∈ AR × AR, a∗ dr b∗ for ranking or Ldi (a∗) > Rd j (b∗) for sorting
and v∗ia∗,b∗ = 1}, and v∗ia∗,b∗ are the corresponding values of the binary variables at the
optimum.
The solutions identified in this way may still be rather similar to each other. To
ensure their greater diversity, we could maximize k indicating the number of pieces of
preference information presented as the subset underlying incompatibility in the cur-
rent iteration that should not be included in the next proposal. Additionally, we should
require that the cardinality of the new subset of pieces of preference information is
not too great, i.e. it could be greater than f ∗i by a small t (t ≥ 0). Proceeding in this





(a∗,b∗)∈Si va∗,b∗ ≤ f ∗i − k
∑
a∗,b∗∈AR , condition(a∗,b∗) va∗,b∗ ≤ f ∗i + t







Note that identification of the minimal subsets of inconsistent pieces of preference
information in the context of multiple DMs, could lead to removal of a significant
subset of preferences of a particular DM, while preserving all statements of all other
DMs. Such solution would not be perceived as “fair” by all DMs. To address this
problem, one could account for minimization of the maximal number of pieces of
preference information of each DM that should be removed. This could be achieved
by consideration of the sum of binary variables associated with statements provided
by each DM. For example, in case of ranking problems, for each dr ∈ D′ we would




va∗,b∗ , for each dr ∈ D′.
Subsequently, we would minimize vD′ defined as follows:
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vD′ = max dr ∈D′vdr , i.e., vD′ ≥ vdr for each dr ∈ D′.
Outcomes of such a procedure may be presented to the DMs as possible ways for
removing incompatibility. In this case, the DMs are asked to review their statements.
Alternatively, once all the minimal subsets of pieces of preference information causing
incompatibility are identified, one may proceed to identification of the minimal subset
of DMs who provided contradictory statements. To achieve this, we need to associate
pairwise comparisons or exemplary assignments coded as va∗,b∗ with identifiers of the
DMs who provided a particular piece of preference information. Knowing the set of
identifiers of DMs corresponding to {(a∗, b∗) ∈ AR × AR : va∗,b∗ = 1} for all mini-
mal subsets of constraints being the cause of incompatibility, we can easily point out
the minimal subset of DMs whose preferences cannot be represented together. Subse-
quently, we eliminate all pieces of preference information and respective constraints
corresponding to the DMs for whom va∗,b∗=1, and pursue the analysis searching for
a representative value function for the maximal number of DMs whose preference
statements were consistent. Such a function may constitute a good support for gener-
ating reactions from the part of the “excluded” DMs, who may modify the previously
supplied preference statements. It may also be used to work out the final recommen-
dation, especially in these decision making situations which involve a single DM and
several experts who provide their preferences.
Notice that all presented ways of dealing with incompatibility for group decision,
i.e. accounting for the minimal magnitude of error, or for the minimal number of
contradictory statements, or for the maximal number of DMs whose statements are
consistent, may be applied to different formulations of the procedures discussed in
Sects. 3.1 and 3.2. Moreover, for the case of considering preference information of
each DM individually, we may simply assume that the best compromise is reflected
by the value function for which the optimized target is maximal. Obviously, a repre-
sentative value function as well as the necessary and possible outcomes resulting from
these computations will not fully respect all exemplary decisions initially provided by
the DMs.
4 Case Studies
In this section, we report results of numerical experiments with two case studies. In
the first case study, we reconsider the problem which has been originally presented
in Greco et al. (2008) to illustrate the UTAGMS method. We analyze it in the context
of several DMs who cooperate to make a collective ranking. We show representa-
tive value functions identified according to the different procedures introduced in this
paper. The second case study is devoted to the problem of sorting different countries
to one of four types of regimes. We use data published by the Economist Intelligence
Unit in 2007 for estimation of the democracy index (EIU 2007), and we reconsider
the stated problem for 40 countries from different regions of the world. We discuss the
necessary and possible assignments for preference information of all DMs considered
individually or jointly. Further, we show representative value functions identified for
these results by different procedures.
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4.1 Assessment of Sales Managers
The CEO of a medium size firm wants to hire new international sales managers. A
recruitment agency has interviewed 15 potential candidates which have been evalu-
ated on 3 criteria (sales management skills (g1), international experience (g2), and
human qualities (g3)) with an increasing direction of preference. Each of the five
workers of the agency has attended a few interviews and is able to express a confident
judgment about some candidates. The evaluations of candidates are given in Table 1,
and preference information in form of pairwise comparisons provided by all DMs,
D = {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, is summarized in Table 2.
Representative Value Function for the Case of Preference Information
of All DMs Considered Jointly
Pairwise comparisons provided by all DMs are consistent, and, consequently, a set
of compatible value functions compatible with reference statements of all DMs in
not empty, i.e. UD = ∅. For this preference information, the necessary and possible
weak preference relations are computed using UTAGMS. The Hasse diagram of the
necessary relation ND for this particular problem is presented in Fig. 1. Note that
the necessary preference relation is transitive. In this perspective, let us remind that
arrows that can be obtained by transitivity are not represented in the Hasse diagram.
Table 1 Performance matrix and representative comprehensive values resulting from four different pro-
cedures for the problem of ranking sales managers






D,G M S (pos)
I Alexievich 4 16 63 0.538 0.533 (6) 0.538 (9) 0.478 (7)
II Bassama 28 18 28 0.615 0.600 (5) 0.654 (5) 0.609 (4)
III Calvet 26 40 44 0.731 0.622 (4) 0.885 (1) 0.696 (1)
IV Dubois 2 2 68 0.308 0.289 (14) 0.308 (14) 0.391 (12)
V El Mrabat 18 17 14 0.385 0.378 (12) 0.500 (11) 0.435 (11)
VI Feeret 35 62 25 0.846 0.844 (1) 0.885 (1) 0.696 (1)
VII Fleichman 7 55 12 0.538 0.533 (6) 0.577 (7) 0.478 (7)
VIII Fourny 25 30 12 0.538 0.511 (8) 0.692 (4) 0.478 (7)
IX Frechet 9 62 88 0.692 0.689 (3) 0.769 (3) 0.652 (3)
X Martin 0 24 73 0.308 0.311 (13) 0.308 (14) 0.391 (12)
XI Petron 6 15 100 0.423 0.400 (11) 0.538 (9) 0.478 (7)
XII Psorgos 16 9 0 0.231 0.222 (15) 0.423 (12) 0.348 (15)
XIII Smith 26 17 17 0.500 0.489 (9) 0.577 (7) 0.522 (6)
XIV Varlot 62 43 0 0.846 0.844 (1) 0.615 (6) 0.609 (4)
XV Yu 1 32 64 0.423 0.422 (10) 0.385 (13) 0.391 (12)
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Table 2 Preference infromation
provided by each DM for the
problem of ranking sales
managers
Preference information
d1 Frechet  Fleichman  Martin, Fleichman  Yu
d2 Frechet  Fourny  Petron, Varlot  Petron
d3 Fleichman  Yu  Martin, Varlot  Yu
d4 Varlot  Calvet, Varlot  Fleichman















Fig. 1 Hasse diagram of the necessary preference relation ND for the problem of ranking sales managers
The valid necessary relation means that a definite pair of alternatives is ranked in the
same way whatever the compatible additive value function. As a result, the DMs may
recognize the necessary relations as the certain preference statements. The necessary
results reflect also the ability of the inferred model to reproduce all pairwise compar-
isons of reference alternatives. In order to choose a representative value function, we
analyze the necessary weak preference relation. In the considered problem, there are
49 ordered pairs of alternatives (a, b), for which a ND b [e.g., (Frechet, Alexievich)].
Since for these pairs the advantage of a over b is evident, we would like to emphasize
it, maximizing the difference between U (a) and U (b). On the other hand, there are
also 88 pairs of alternatives c, d ∈ A, for which not (c ND d) and not (d ND c) (e.g.,
Alexievich and Fleichman). These pairs of alternatives are necessarily incomparable
or necessarily indifferent, so analyzing robust results one cannot indicate the better
alternative among them. Therefore, we wish to minimize the difference between U (c)
and U (d). All pairs (a, b) and (c, d) satisfying these specific conditions contribute to
the definition of a representative value function according to the procedure presented
in Sect. 3.1.
In a sense, the employed procedure “flattened” the consequences of applying all
compatible value functions to set A by using a single instance of the preference
model. The representative value function permits the users to see the score of each
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Fig. 2 Representative marginal value functions for the case of considering preference information of all
DMs jointly
alternative, and to assess relative importance of the criteria, extending capacity of the
robust method in explaining its final output. Figure 2 illustrates the representative mar-
ginal value functions. They form a very intuitive representation of the output of the
ordinal regression method, which helps to understand the results of the robust ranking.
The characteristic points marked in the figure correspond to the marginal values of the
considered alternatives. Although in the figure connections between these points are
linear, it would be sufficient if they reflected the monotonic character. For this case,
sales management skills criterion has the greatest share in the comprehensive values,
whereas human qualities criterion has the least share. The same order can be observed
with respect to the variation of marginal values. Such distribution of the shares along
with the differentiation of the values by marginal value functions reflect consequences
of the preferences of the DMs in the best way.
The resulting representative comprehensive values are presented in Table 1 (see
column U RD). Notice that relations between these values represent all pieces of pref-
erence information which have been provided by the DMs. Moreover, analyzing the
specific pairs of alternatives, one can notice that the difference between their values is
either relatively great, because one of them is necessarily preferred to the other [e.g.,
(Bassama, Psorgos), (Frechet, Alexievich)], or intentionally neglected as they are pos-
sibly indifferent (there are a few pairs or triples of alternatives which are assigned equal
comprehensive values [e.g., (Alexievich, Fleichman), (Petron, Yu)].
Note that the highest representative comprehensive values are assigned to Feeret
and Varlot, which are not necessarily outranked by any other alternative. On the other
hand, for Psorgos, Dubois, and Martin the comprehensive values are the smallest.
These alternatives are not necessarily better than any other alternative, while being
necessarily worse than numerous other candidates. Finally, let us note that although
Calvet is necessarily outranked by Varlot, its representative comprehensive value is
greater than U RD(a) for Bassama, which could be possibly ranked at the top of the
ranking for some compatible value functions. It is the case, since Calvet is necessarily
preferred to a majority of other alternatives, while Bassama is incomparable in terms
of the necessary relation even with candidates that could be perceived as the potential
worst options, i.e. Dubois and Martin. These observations prove that the represen-
tative value function emphasizes the most certain recommendation, and at the same
finds a reasonable compromise between all possible recommendations. In this way, the
clarity of classical UTA-like methods is combined with the analysis conducted within
the framework of robust ordinal regression. Consequently, the ranking which stems
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from ordering the alternatives with respect to the values U RD(a) should be perceived
as representative in the sense of robustness of the provided solutions.
Representative Value Functions for the Maximal Subset of DMs
Whose Preference Statements are Consistent
Let us assume that in addition to preference information given in Table 1, d5 provided
preference statement: Fourny  Varlot. In this case, analysis of compatibility reveals
that there is no additive function which could reproduce partial preorders supplied
by all DMs. This means that pairwise comparisons of two (or more) DMs are con-
tradictory. Indeed, after their identification, we get to know that statements Varlot 
Calvet and Fourny  Varlot cannot be represented together. The previous has been
provided by d4, whereas the other by d5. Therefore, there are two maximal subsets
of DMs whose statements can be reproduced by a consistent collective model, i.e.:
D1 = {d1, d2, d3, d4} and D2 = {d1, d2, d3, d5}.
Having removed preference information either of d4 or d5, we obtain preference
models which are representative for coalitions of convergent DMs whose statements
are not contradictory. One can notice some slight differences when looking at the
representative marginal value functions obtained for D1 and D2 (see Fig. 3). In the
other case, the share of sales management skills in the comprehensive values is less
than in the first case in favor of human qualities criterion. The resulting representative
comprehensive values are presented in Table 1 (see columns U RD1 and U RD2 ). Since
they reflect preferences of the same three DMs and differ with respect to only one
expert, the correlation (measured using Kendall’s coefficient) between the represen-
tative rankings which follow those values is high (nearly 0.7). The main differences
result from the explicit preferences of the included (excluded) DMs. For coalition D1,
Varlot is higher in the ranking than for D2, since d4 strongly opts for its high position.
On the other hand, for coalition D2, Fourny and Calvet occupy higher positions than
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Fig. 3 Representative marginal value functions for the maximal subsets of DMs whose statements are not
contradictory
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have excluded from consideration the statements of d4 who claimed that Calvet is
worse than Varlot.
Analysis of the representative values and corresponding rankings may convince the
DMs whose preferences were incompatible with pairwise comparisons of the others,
to reconsider their statements. In particular, d5 should reconsider the statement: Fourny
 Varlot, since when neglecting her/his preferences, in a representative case Varlot is
ranked first, while Fourny is ranked eighth. In the same spirit, d4 may be encouraged
to remove statement: Varlot  Calvet, because for the subset D2, Calvet is ranked at
the very top. Finally, all DMs should pay special attention to the alternatives which
are ranked either high (e.g., Feeret, Frechet, Calvet) or low (e.g., Psorgos, Dubois,
Martin, Yu) for both analyzed subsets of DMs, and possibly refer to these candidates
when providing pairwise comparisons in the next iteration.
Representative Value Function for the Case of Preference Information
of Each DM Considered Individually
Although the preference information provided by all DMs in the previously discussed
case is inconsistent when considered jointly, the statements of each DM are con-
sistent when analyzed individually. Consequently, in order to select a representative
value function and obtain results which follow its use, we can take advantage of the
UTAGMS-GROUP method, and subsequently make the difference between values of
specific alternatives dependent on the inclusion relation on the set of all subsets of
DMs for whom the specific relations hold. The results concerning the “necessary-nec-
essary” preference relation N ,ND for the subset of alternatives are presented in Table 3.
Its cells are filled with indices (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) standing for the DMs for whom the
necessary relation Ndr holds [e.g., (VII, X)= (Fleichman, Martin)={1, 3}, means that
Fleichman Ndr Martin holds for d1 and d3, and does not hold for d2, d4, and d5].
In this case, the representative value function is identified with the use of the pro-
cedure presented in Sect. 3.2. Explaining its main rule with respect to the consid-
ered example, one may say that the desired difference between values of alternatives
for which the strict necessary preference relation holds for all DMs [e.g., (VI, VII),
(IX, X)] should be greater than for such pairs of alternatives, for which this relation
Table 3 A part of the matrix of the necessary N ,ND relation for the problem of ranking sales managers
N ,ND . VI VII VIII IX X .
. . . . . . . .
VI . 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 − 1, 3, 5 .
VII . − 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3 − 1, 3 .
VIII . − − 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 − 3, 5 .
IX . − 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 .
X . − − − − 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 .
. . . . . . . .
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e Sales management skills
Fig. 4 Representative marginal value functions for the case of considering preference information of all
DMs individually
holds for the proper subsets of D [e.g., (VI, X), (VII, VIII)]. Further, the difference
between values of alternatives for which the relation Ndr holds for d1, d3, and d5[e.g., (VI, X)] should be greater than for pairs of alternatives for which the considered
relation holds only for d1 and d3 [e.g., (VII, X)], or d3 and d5 [e.g., (VIII, X)], or only
d3 [e.g., (VII, VIII)], etc. Finally, if for the considered pair of alternatives the relation
Ndr holds for at least one DM, the desired difference between their comprehensive
values should be greater than between values of alternatives for which the relation Ndr
does not hold for any expert.
Figure 4 illustrates the obtained marginal value functions for the case of consider-
ing preference information of each DM individually. They are similar to those which
were identified in the previous case with sales management skills having the greatest
share in the comprehensive values.
Table 1 summarizes comprehensive values obtained for the representative value
function (see column U RD,G M S). The ranking determined by these values can be con-
sidered as a synthetic representation of the results of the UTAGMS-GROUP method.
Its correlation with the rankings determined for D1 and D2 is equal to 0.72 and 0.79,
respectively. However, one has to notice that it does not reproduce all pairwise compar-
isons of all DMs, since, as it was previously proved, it is impossible when modeling
preference using a general additive value function (e.g., relations Varlot  Calvet
and Fourny  Varlot are not reflected). As already mentioned in Sect. 3.3, a possible
extension of this approach would be to require reproduction of the maximal number of
consistent statements of the DMs, or to guarantee fulfillment of pairwise comparisons
provided by the subset of DMs who are included in all possible maximal subsets of
DMs whose statements are complementary.
4.2 Democracy Index: Assigning Countries to the Types of Regimes
There is no consensus on how to measure democracy. The Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) proposed to consider 60 indicators grouped in five categories which form
a coherent conceptual whole: electoral process and pluralism (g1), the functioning of
government (g2), political participation (g3), political culture (g4), and civil liberties
(g5). The index they work out, which is the simple average of the five main criteria,
provides a snapshot of the current state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent
states and two territories. Then, index values are used to place countries within one of
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Table 4 Preference information provided by each DM for the problem of assigning countries to different
types of regimes
Preference information
d1 C4—USA, Costa Rica, C3—Honduras, C2—Nicaragua, C1—Cuba
d2 C3—Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, C2—Singapore, Cambodia, Fiji
d3 C4—Japan, C3—South Korea, Hong Kong, C2—Kyrgyzstan, C1—Uzbekistan, China
four types of regimes: full democracies (C4), flawed democracies (C3), hybrid regimes
(C2), and authoritarian regimes (C1).
Let us reconsider a subset of 40 countries from the data set provided by EIU. These
countries can be grouped into 3 regions: 14 from Northern and Central America, 13
from Australasia and Southeast Asia, and 13 from Central and East Asia. Let us assume
that there are 3 DMs (D={d1, d2, d3}), each one being an expert of the political issues
of the specific region. Thus, they are able to provide some exemplary assignments
concerning countries they are familiar with (see Table 4).
Representative Value Function for the Case of Preference Information
of Each DM Considered Jointly
Since every DM serves as an expert only for a subset of countries, it is reasonable to
conduct the comprehensive analysis, considering preference information of all DMs
jointly. The possible assignments [L PD(a), R PD(a)], for all a ∈ A, are given in Table 5.
The average width of the range of possible classes is equal to 1.375. For 29 alterna-
tives for which the possible assignment is precise, the necessary range of classes is
not empty, [L ND(a), RND(a)] = ∅. For other alternatives the result of sorting depends
on which compatible value function would underly the proper assignment procedure.
Since the preference information provided by the DMs agrees with the actual classes
assigned by EIU, and the weighted sum aggregation model used by them is a particular
case of the additive value function, one can notice that the class determined by EIU
(see column C(a) in Table 5) is in the range of possible assignments for each country.
In order to formulate targets which should be optimized when selecting a representa-
tive value function, we check the truth of relations →D , ∼→D , and ≺→D for all pairs
of alternatives. As a result, there are 426 pairs (a, b), such that a →D b, and 582 pairs
c, d ∈ A, such that c ∼→D d or c ≺→D d.
Figure 5 illustrates the obtained representative marginal value functions (see the
continuous lines). The number of characteristic points for these functions is close
to the number of alternatives, so we have marked only those points for which the
marginal value changes. Electoral process and pluralism criterion (g1) has slightly
greater share in the comprehensive values than other criteria, but the maximal share
of all criteria is greater than 0.15. It is interesting in the context of equal weights of
all impacts assumed by EIU in their analysis. Table 6 summarizes values and assign-
ments computed using the representative value function (see columns U R and L RD −
RRD). Analysis of the distribution of the representative comprehensive values allows
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Table 5 Performance matrix and actual and possible assignments for the problem of assigning countries
to different types of regimes
Country g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 C(a) L PD(a) R
P
D(a)
1 Australia 10.00 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00 4 4 4
2 Canada 9.17 9.64 7.78 8.75 10.00 4 4 4
3 New Zealand 10.00 8.57 8.33 8.13 10.00 4 4 4
4 USA 8.75 7.86 7.22 8.75 8.53 4 4 4
5 Japan 9.17 7.86 5.56 8.75 9.41 4 4 4
6 Costa Rica 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41 4 4 4
7 South Korea 9.58 7.14 7.22 7.50 7.94 3 3 3
8 Taiwan 9.58 7.50 6.67 5.63 9.71 3 3 3
9 Panama 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 8.82 3 3 3
10 Jamaica 9.17 7.14 5.00 6.25 9.12 3 3 4
11 Trin. & Tob. 9.17 6.79 6.11 5.63 8.24 3 3 3
12 Mexico 8.75 6.07 5.00 5.00 8.53 3 2 3
13 Mongolia 9.17 6.08 3.89 5.63 8.24 2 3 3
14 Papua New G. 7.33 6.43 4.44 6.25 8.24 3 2 4
15 Philippines 9.17 5.36 5.00 3.75 9.12 3 3 3
16 Indonesia 6.92 7.14 5.00 6.25 6.76 3 3 3
17 Timor Leste 7.00 5.57 5.00 6.25 8.24 3 2 4
18 Honduras 8.33 6.43 4.44 5.00 7.06 3 3 3
19 Salvador 9.17 5.43 3.89 4.38 8.24 3 2 4
20 Dom. Rep. 9.17 4.29 3.33 5.63 8.24 3 2 3
21 Guatemala 8.75 6.79 2.78 4.38 7.65 3 2 4
22 Hong Kong 3.50 5.71 5.00 6.25 9.71 3 3 3
23 Malayasia 6.08 5.71 4.44 7.50 6.18 3 3 3
24 Singapore 4.33 7.50 2.78 7.50 7.35 2 2 2
25 Nicaragua 8.25 5.71 3.33 3.75 7.35 2 2 2
26 Thailand 4.83 6.43 5.00 5.63 6.47 2 2 4
27 Fiji 6.50 5.21 3.33 5.00 8.24 2 2 2
28 Cambodia 5.58 6.07 2.78 5.00 4.41 2 2 2
29 Haiti 5.58 3.64 2.78 2.50 6.47 2 1 2
30 Kyrgyzstan 5.75 1.86 2.78 5.00 5.00 2 2 2
31 Kazkhstan 2.67 2.14 3.33 4.38 5.59 1 1 2
32 Cuba 1.75 4.64 3.89 4.38 2.94 1 1 1
33 China 0.00 4.64 2.78 6.25 1.18 1 1 1
34 Vietnam 0.83 4.29 2.78 4.38 1.47 1 1 1
35 Tajikistan 1.83 0.79 2.22 6.25 1.18 1 1 2
36 Laos 0.00 3.21 1.11 5.00 1.18 1 1 1
37 Uzbekistan 0.08 0.79 2.78 5.00 0.59 1 1 1
38 Turkmenistan 0.00 0.79 2.78 5.00 0.59 1 1 1
39 Myanmar 0.00 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88 1 1 1
40 North Korea 0.83 2.50 0.56 1.25 0.00 1 1 1
123





















































Fig. 5 The marginal value functions resulting from two different procedures of selection of a single com-
patible value function for the problem of assigning countries to different types of regimes
Table 6 Comprehensive values and assignments stemming from two different procedures for selection of
the representative value function for the problem of assigning countries to different types of regimes
Country U RD L
R
D − R RD U RD,G M S L RD,G M S − R RD,G M S
1 Australia 0.939 4 0.915 4
2 Canada 0.939 4 0.915 4
3 New Zealand 0.939 4 0.880 4
4 USA 0.878 4 0.880 4
5 Japan 0.939 4 0.880 4
6 Costa Rica 0.878 4 0.744 4
7 South Korea 0.634 3 0.692 3
8 Taiwan 0.656 3 0.726 3
9 Panama 0.618 3 0.692 3
10 Jamaica 0.672 3 − 4 0.692 3
11 Trin. & Tob. 0.567 3 0.692 3
12 Mexico 0.586 3 0.603 3
13 Mongolia 0.412 2 − 3 0.538 3
14 Papua New G. 0.586 3 0.538 3
15 Philippines 0.567 3 0.513 3
16 Indonesia 0.567 3 0.506 3
17 Timor Leste 0.586 3 0.504 3
18 Honduras 0.567 3 0.513 3
19 Salvador 0.405 2 − 3 0.513 3
20 Dom. Rep. 0.412 2 − 3 0.402 2 − 3
21 Guatemala 0.405 2 − 3 0.444 3
22 Hong Kong 0.567 3 0.444 3
23 Malayasia 0.567 2 − 3 0.513 3
24 Singapore 0.336 2 0.325 2
25 Nicaragua 0.336 2 0.325 2
26 Thailand 0.405 2 − 3 0.325 2
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Table 6 Continued
Country U RD L
R
D − R RD U RD,G M S L RD,G M S − R RD,G M S
27 Fiji 0.336 2 0.325 2
28 Cambodia 0.336 2 0.256 2
29 Haiti 0.275 1 − 2 0.137 1
30 Kyrgyzstan 0.336 2 0.256 2
31 Kazkhstan 0.252 1 − 2 0.137 1
32 Cuba 0.115 1 0.137 1
33 China 0.115 1 0.068 1
34 Vietnam 0.115 1 0.068 1
35 Tajikistan 0.252 1 − 2 0.085 1
36 Laos 0.061 1 0.051 1
37 Uzbekistan 0.061 1 0.051 1
38 Turkmenistan 0.061 1 0.051 1
39 Myanmar 0.061 1 0.051 1
40 North Korea 0.061 1 0.017 1
distinction of four ranges of main concentration of the respective alternatives. These
are: 0.061 − 0.115, 0.336 − 0.336, 0.567 − 0.656, and 0.878 − 0.939. Each of these
ranges aggregates alternatives for which there is no doubt about their assignment (their
possible assignments are precise). The width of such a single range is significantly
less than the distance between extreme values of two consecutive ranges. It stems
from the requirements we have stated with respect to the representative value func-
tion. Precisely, given a pair of alternatives, the one which is certainly in a better class
in the context of all compatible functions, should have significantly greater value. On
the other hand, if two alternatives are always in the same class or the order of their
classes is not univocal, the difference between their values should be reasonably small.
Outside of the above listed four ranges of comprehensive values, there are values of
alternatives for which the possible assignments are not precise.
As far as representative assignments are concerned, they are more precise than
possible ones, and more general than necessary assignments. In fact, since the repre-
sentative value function U RD ∈ UD, for all a ∈ A, it always holds:
[L ND(a), RND(a)] ⊆ C RD(a) = [L RD(a), RRD(a)] ⊆ [L PD(a), R PD(a)].
Among 22 non-reference alternatives, there are 12 for which the outcomes of the
example-based procedure driven by the representative value function are precise. For
this particular case, these assignments agree with the classes determined by EIU. The
evaluation profiles of the remaining 10 alternatives which are assigned to imprecise
ranges of classes, are most often not typical for a given political regime, i.e. they
are either among the best or the worst countries in a particular class with respect
to a democracy index computed by EIU (see, e.g., Jamaica, Malaysia, Guatemala,
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Dominican Republic, Thailand, Haiti, Kazakhstan). In this context, the hesitation in
the final recommendation seems to be justified.
Comparison with Results of UTADISGMS
In order to provide empirical evidence of some implications presented in Sect. 3.1, we
will discuss results obtained for this particular problem with UTADISGMS-GROUP. In
this case, we consider preference information of each DM individually, we determine
its possible and necessary consequences, and only then we combine them into neces-
sary-necessary, necessary-possible, possible-necessary, and possible-possible results.
Since necessary assignments are often empty, especially when preference infor-
mation supplied by the DMs is not rich, C N ,ND (a), a ∈ A, are empty as well. As
far as C N ,PD (a), a ∈ A, are concerned, for this particular problem, they are non-
empty for 23 countries, which means that at least one DM from D is either sure
about their desired class and expresses it directly in her/his preference statements, or
all instances of a preference model compatible with her/his preference information
confirm the same resulting assignment. However, as it was claimed in Greco et al.
(2011a), in connection with emptiness of the “necessary-” assignments for numerous
alternatives, for real-world decision problems the analysis should be rather focused on
C P,PD and C
P,N
D . The possible-possible assignments review all possible consequences
of preference information of all DMs on sorting of the whole set of countries (see
Table 7). For each a ∈ A, C P,PD (a) is not precise, which means that in the context of
all compatible instances of a preference model, there is a hesitation with respect to
their desired class. Precisely, there are 16 countries which can be possibly assigned
to all four classes C1 − C4, 18 countries assigned to the range of three contiguous
classes, and 6 countries which are assigned to the range C2 − C3 or C3 − C4.
If the ranges of classes representing the possible-possible assignments are too wide
to be decisive enough, one should analyze the possible-necessary assignments. They
are formed by the intersection of the possible ranges of classes for all DMs (see
Table 8). With respect to C P,ND , there are no countries possibly assigned to four classes.
Table 7 Possible-possible C P,PD assignments for the problem of assigning countries to different types of
regimes
C P,PD Assigned countries
C3 − C4 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea
C2 − C4 USA, Costa Rica, Taiwan, Panama, Jamaica, Trinidad, Mexico, Mongolia
C1 − C4 Papua, Philippines, Indonesia, Timor, Salvador, Dominican Rep.,
Guatemala, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan,
China, Tajikistan, Myanmar
C2 − C3 Honduras
C1 − C3 Nicaragua, Cambodia, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, North Korea
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Table 8 Possible-necessary C P,ND assignments for the problem of assigning countries to different types
of regimes
C P,ND Assigned countries
C4 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA, Japan, Costa Rica
C3 − C4 Jamaica
C2 − C4 Salvador, Guatemala
C3 South Korea, Taiwan, Panama, Trinidad, Honduras
C2 − C3 Mexico, Mongolia, Dominican Rep.
C1 − C3 Papua, Timor, Thailand
C2 Philippines, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Nicaragua,
Fiji, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan
C1 − C2 Haiti, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Laos, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Myanmar, North Korea
C1 Cuba, China, Vietnam
In fact, for 23 of them the possible-necessary assignments are precise, 12 countries are
assigned to two contiguous classes, and only for 5 alternatives each DM admits assign-
ment to the same range of three classes. Analyzing results of this problem, we can
find confirmation of the following general relation: for all a ∈ A, C PD(a) ⊆ C P,ND (a),
and, more generally, for all a ∈ A and D′ ⊆ D:
C N ,ND′ (a) ⊆ C ND′(a) ⊆ C RD′(a) ⊆ C PD′(a) ⊆ C P,ND′ (a) ⊆ C P,PD′ (a),
which stems from the propositions presented in Sect. 3.1 and in Greco et al. (2011a).
Representative Value Function for the Case of Preference Information
of Each DM Considered Individually
For illustration, let us also present the representative value function for the case of
considering exemplary assignments of each DM individually. In order to formulate
the targets which should be optimized in this case, we check the truth of relations →,
∼→, and ≺→ for all pairs of alternatives for each DM, and run the procedure pre-
sented in Sect. 3.2. The representative comprehensive values are presented in Table 6,
and denoted by U RD,G M S . Note that these values are characterized by greater differen-
tiation than results obtained for the case of considering preference information of all
DMs jointly. Since consequences of preferences of all DMs are analyzed separately,
there are more pairs of alternatives to which we would like to assign different inten-
sity of the difference between their comprehensive values. Consequently, one could
indicate several ranges of main concentration of the comprehensive values, and not
only four such ranges as in case of U RD. Nevertheless, the correlation between the
orders determined by U RD and U
R
D,G M S is very high. There is also a great similarity
in the shape of the marginal value functions (see dashed lines in Fig. 5). The main
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differences concern slightly less share of electoral process and pluralism criterion (g1)
in the comprehensive value, and greater differentiation of marginal values. As for the
representative assignments (see column L RD,G M S − RRD,G M S in Table 6), they are pre-
cise for 39 out of 40 alternatives. When comparing them to the classes determined by
EIU, the provided recommendation differs only in case of Haiti. It is also interesting
to note that the intersection of ranges L RD − RRD and L RD,G M S − RRD,G M S is non-empty
for all considered alternatives.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered decision situations with multiple stakeholders, each
having her/his own preferences. We have introduced the concept of the representative
value function for group decision concerning multiple criteria ranking, choice, and
sorting problems. The presented approach adopts features of UTAGMS, UTADISGMS,
UTAGMS-GROUP, and UTADISGMS-GROUP, as it takes into account the set of all
additive value functions composed of monotonic general marginal value functions
compatible with the preference information provided by all DMs. It is an innovative
approach, because we optimize the targets which refer to the robust results, i.e. to the
consequences of preference information supplied by the DMs considered in terms of
compatible value functions, rather than only to preference information itself. Since
every compatible value function contributes to the necessary and possible results, it
has a direct impact on the shape of the representative value function. In this way, the
introduced procedure refers to “one for all, all for one” motto, and does not contradict
the rationale of robust ordinal regression. It is the case, because we do not loose the
advantage of knowing all compatible instances of the preference model of all DMs.
The representative instance should be rather perceived as continuation of the trend of
taking into account all compatible value functions, which allows to address potential
problems with interpretation of the outcomes of the GROUP methods.
Moreover, our proposal is innovative also with respect to consideration of general
additive value functions, which are composed of monotonic marginal value functions,
instead of linear or piecewise-linear ones. Besides, when comparing the introduced
approach with other UTA-like procedures (see, e.g., Siskos and Yanacopoulos 1985;
Beuthe and Scannella 2001; Bous et al. 2010), one has to stress the sole context of
group decision, which raises importance of our methodology. Indeed, group deci-
sion-making is among the most crucial and frequently encountered processes within
companies and organizations.
We suggest several uses of a representative value function:
– a complementary use along with the family of GROUP methods in order to help
the DMs to understand results of the robust ordinal regression,
– assessment of a share of a given criterion in the comprehensive value,
– an autonomous use in order to supply the DM with the scores obtained by alter-
natives for the representative value function as well as with the representative
univocal recommendation,
– estimation of the similarities and disagreements between consequences of one’s
preferences with a compromise results representative for all DMs.
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As far as future developments of the presented methodology are concerned, we intend
to introduce the concept of the representative set of parameters in robust ordinal regres-
sion for outranking methods. Its definition would be based on the exploitation of the
matrices of necessary and possible outranking relations. This would be done for a
single DM (an initial idea of this approach has been presented in Greco et al. 2010a)
as well as for multiple decision makers. Moreover, dealing with incompatibility of
preference information in a group decision context and proposing some new proce-
dures for ensuring “fairness” (understood in different ways) of the solutions suggested
for removing inconsistency constitutes envisaged future development. In particular,
these procedures may account for differentiation of the weights of the DMs.
Acknowledgements The first and the third authors wish to acknowledge financial support from the Polish
Ministry of Science and Higher Education, grant no. N N519 441939.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Angilella S, Greco S, Matarazzo B (2010) Non-additive robust ordinal regression: a multiple criteria deci-
sion model based on the choquet integral. Eur J Oper Res 201(1):277–288
Beuthe M, Scannella G (2001) Comparative analysis of UTA multicriteria methods. Eur J Oper Res
130(2):246–262
Bous G, Fortemps P, Glineur F, Pirlot M (2010) ACUTA: A novel method for eliciting additive value
functions on the basis of holistic preference statements. Eur J Oper Res 206(2):435–444
Despotis D, Yanacopoulos D, Zopounidis C (1990) A review of the UTA multucriteria method and some
improvements. Found Comput Decis Sci 15(2):63–76
EIU (2007) The Economist Intelligence Units index of democracy. Economist Intelligence Unit, London
Figueira J, Greco S, Słowin´ski R (2008) Identifying the most representative value function among all com-
patible value functions in the GRIP. Proceedings of the 68th EURO Working Group on MCDA Chania,
Greece
Figueira J, Greco S, Słowin´ski R (2009) Building a set of additive value functions representing a reference
preorder and intensities of preference: GRIP method. Eur J Oper Res 195(2):460–486
Greco S, Matarazzo B, Słowin´ski R (1999) Rough approximation of a preference relation by dominance
relations. Eur J Oper Res 117(1):63–83
Greco S, Mousseau V, Słowin´ski R (2008) Ordinal regression revisited: multiple criteria ranking using a
set of additive value functions. Eur J Oper Res 191(2):415–435
Greco S, Mousseau V, Słowin´ski R (2009) The possible and the necessary for multiple criteria group deci-
sion. In: Rossi F, Tsoukias AAlgorithmic decision theory (ADT 2009), LNAI 5783. Springer, Berlin
pp 203–214
Greco S, Kadzin´ski M, Słowin´ski R (2010a) The most representative parameter set for robust outranking
approach. Presented at the 71st meeting of the European working group on multiple criteria decision
aiding. Torino, Italy
Greco S, Mousseau V, Słowin´ski R (2010b) Multiple criteria sorting with a set of additive value functions.
Eur J Oper Res 207(4):1455–1470
Greco S, Słowin´ski R, Mousseau V, Figueira J (2010c) Robust ordinal regression. In: Ehrgott M, Figueira
J, Greco STrends in multiple criteria decision analysis. Springer, Berlin pp 273–320
Greco S, Kadzin´ski M, Mousseau V, Słowin´ski R (2011a) Robust ordinal regression for multiple criteria
group decision: UTAGMS-GROUP and UTADISGMS-GROUP. Deci Support Syst. doi:10.1016/j.dss.
2011.10.005
Greco S, Kadzin´ski M, Mousseau V, Słowin´ski R (2011b) ELECTREGKMS: Robust ordinal regression for
outranking methods. Eur J Oper Res 214(1):118–135
123
462 M. Kadzin´ski et al.
Greco S, Kadzin´ski M, Słowin´ski R (2011c) Selection of a representative value function in robust multiple
criteria sorting. Comput Oper Res 38(11):1620–1637
Jacquet-Lagrèze E, Shakun M (1984) Decision support systems for semistructured buying decisions. Eur J
Oper Res 16:48–56
Jacquet-Lagrèze E, Siskos Y (1982) Assessing a set of additive utility functions for multicriteria decision
making: the UTA method. Eur J Oper Res 10:151–164
Jarke M, Jelassi M, Shakun M (1987) MEDIATOR: toward a negotiation support system. Eur J Oper Res
31(3):314–334
Kadzin´ski M, Greco S, Słowin´ski R (2012a) Extreme ranking analysis in robust ordinal regression. Omega
40(4):488–501
Kadzin´ski M, Greco S, Słowin´ski R (2012b) Selection of a representative value function in robust multiple
criteria ranking and choice. Eur J Oper Res 217(3):541–553
Matsatsinis N, Samaras AP (2001) MCDA and preference disaggregation in group decision support. Eur J
Oper Res 130(2):414–429
Mousseau V, Dias L, Figueira J (2006) Dealing with inconsistent judgments in multiple criteria sorting
models. 4OR 4(3):145–158
Mousseau V, Dias L, Figueira J, Gomes C, Clímaco J (2003) Resolving inconsistencies among constraints
on the parameters of an MCDA model. Eur J Oper Res 147(1):72–93
Mousseau V, Słowin´ski R (1998) Inferring an ELECTRE TRI model from assignment examples. J Glob
Optim 12(2):157–174
Roy B (1985) Méthodologie Multicritère d’aide à la Décision. Economica, Paris
Siskos Y, Grigoroudis E, Matsatsinis N (2005) UTA methods. In: Figueira J, Greco S, Ehrgott MMultiple
criteria decision analysis: state of the art surveys. Springer, Boston pp 297–344
Siskos Y, Yanacopoulos D (1985) UTA STAR—an ordinal regression method for building additive value
functions. Investig Oper 5:39–53
123
